

# Militarization in the North-East of Sri Lanka and Tamil National Identity

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## Abstract

In the nine years since the war ended, the North-East of Sri Lanka has only grown increasingly militarized, while its Tamil population continues to be securitized; parallel processes that are used to reinforce and justify each other. This paper is an introductory exploration of the question of whether the militarization and securitization project, if it continues, will negatively impact Tamil political aspirations, particularly those that challenge the Sinhala state order in the form of self-determination and nationhood. This paper explores this question through the lens of social capital and oppression. The paper finds that militarization through its negative impact on intra-community networks, trust and cohesiveness has resulted in decreased 'bonding social capital' within the Tamil community, which could theoretically negatively impact the capacity for collective action and thereby Tamil nationalism. Similarly, the paper finds that if the normalization of oppressive military structures continues, this could also theoretically have negative impacts on Tamil national identity by reducing awareness/understanding of one of the political processes that has always driven it forward. The paper concludes that the processes of militarization and securitization are creating: (a) mobilization of fear; (b) reduction of social bonding capital; and (c) normalization/internalization of oppression. If these phenomena continue, there is a growing risk that Tamil political aspirations centred on self-determination and nationhood from the grassroots population will be dampened, though this paper does not find this conclusively or fatalistically, acknowledging that Tamil national identity is the result of complex and multi-faceted processes (as argued by Dr. Madurika Rasaratnam). Nonetheless, this paper points to a critical need for further rigorous analysis and research on the impact of militarization and securitization on Tamil national identity.

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## Introduction

The process of militarization as defined by scholar Cynthia Enloe is, "the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria."<sup>1</sup>

In the nine years since the war in Sri Lanka ended, rather than decrease levels of militarization, Sri Lanka has instead steadily increased the military's role in the lives of Tamil communities in the North-East resulting in these communities being controlled by and dependent on the military, particularly in the Vanni region.<sup>2</sup> While the number of military personnel has decreased slightly from 300,000 to 243,000 at last count,<sup>3</sup> areas in the Vanni such as Mullaitivu still have a ratio of one soldier to every two civilians.<sup>4</sup> Militarization in the North-East, however, does not just refer to the number of troops in the region - the military permeates all aspects of civilian life ranging from employment to education. The military's 'Civil Security Department,' for example, employs over 3,500 mostly former LTTE cadres in the Vanni, and ensures that their roles remain heavily militarized, going so far as to require many of them to attend mandatory military training and don uniforms.<sup>5</sup> Constant physical reminders of the military surround Tamil communities, from the enormous gated camps on occupied lands to the ostentatious war monuments throughout the North-East.<sup>6</sup> The short-term impact of the militarization of these areas has been well documented, with detrimental effects including ongoing human rights violations and repression of economic growth.<sup>7</sup>

Alongside militarization, hyper-securitization of the Tamil population has also continued since the end of the war. Securitization refers to the process by which the Tamil population is presented as an "existential threat" to the Sri Lankan state.<sup>8</sup> This at times exists in the form of persistent discourse by the Sri Lankan state of the threat of a resurgence of the LTTE. Reports of LTTE resurgence and regrouping often crop up around significant commemorative

dates of the year<sup>9</sup>. The Tamil diaspora is also painted as a threat that must be monitored and disconnected from Tamils on the island.<sup>10</sup> As Madurika Rasaratnam writes about Sri Lanka's perceptions, "after the war, 'the diaspora' has replaced the LTTE as the malevolent new force of Tamil nationalism threatening Sinhala Buddhist order, and therefore 'terrorist' by definition."<sup>11</sup> This securitization then in turn is used to justify the militarization, and both are mutually reinforcing processes.<sup>12</sup>

A longer-term but equally alarming impact of this militarization and securitization project that must be examined is its impact on Tamil political aspirations. This paper is an introductory exploration of the question of whether the militarization project, if it continues, will negatively impact Tamil political aspirations, particularly those that challenge the Sinhala state order in the form of self-determination and nationhood. This paper seeks to explore the theoretical framework of social capital and its application to the militarization context.

#### **Militarization and the 'Mobilisation of Fear'**

*"We can't trust anyone in our village – I heard that man [neighbor] is an informant for the military, and apparently that woman [another neighbor] has been seen with intelligence at her house."<sup>13</sup>*

This comment by a former LTTE cadre now living in Jaffna is one that is commonly heard across the North-East post-2009. War-affected Tamil communities encountered and interviewed by the author between 2016 and 2018 across all eight districts of the North-East, but in particular Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi, Trincomalee, and Jaffna, all share a perception that their communities have been penetrated by deep and vast intelligence networks comprising not just the obvious external security forces, but more importantly, their "own". Whether in places of open resistance such as protests by families of the disappeared, or in peoples' own homes, Tamils in the North-East do not feel safe or beyond the reach of the Sri Lankan state's omnipresent ear.

Following the war's conclusion, the entire Tamil community was subjected to the military's physical presence and surveillance structures, and intelligence officers and informants became a facet of everyday-life in the North-East.<sup>14</sup> A. Satkunanathan writes that the impact of this was the 'mobilization of fear'

through the creation of a widespread "belief that an extensive and deep-seated surveillance mechanism exists in the North which would take punitive measures against those who are perceived to contravene the *diktas* of the military," and which "enabled the military to control the behaviour of the population even in the absence of a visible physical uniformed military presence."<sup>15</sup>

I would take this one step further and argue that the belief extended to thinking that punitive measures would be taken if one were perceived to be contravening the *diktas* of the Sri Lankan state. As a former STF interrogator reported to International, Truth and Justice Project (ITJP):

"The regime ['Rajapaksa regime'] had a belief that there were only two types of people – those who supported them to win the war at all costs or those that opposed them. If you were considered an opponent this meant that you were pro-LTTE in their eyes. There were a number of people who spoke out against the government or were critical of the Rajapaksa brothers. These included Tamil politicians (TNA), journalists, both Sinhala and Tamil, and Human Rights campaigners."<sup>16</sup>

The broad understanding of what could be considered anti-Sri Lankan state was developed during the last phase of the war and in the post-2009 era under the Rajapaksa regime. This understanding was quite expansive, and goes beyond just violence or militancy to include activities such as demanding rights and/or justice, and generally anything that was seen as an attempt to challenge the Sinhala state order including through peaceful political processes.<sup>17</sup> As A. Satkunanathan writes quoting Rojas et al., "the communitarian view adopted by the President, 'eradicates politics by rejecting the existence of political antagonisms; the only antagonism is located outside the community: terrorism'.<sup>18</sup> Thus, post-2009, a deep-rooted culture of fear, of doing anything that could be seen as antagonistic towards the Sri Lankan state, took hold in the Tamil community, including most forms of civic or political engagement outside of supporting the President's party or doing the anonymous act of voting. Arrests, enforced disappearances, killings, rape, and torture of anyone who was seen as engaging in this expansive definition of anti-Sri Lankan state activities by the Sri Lankan security forces continued post-2009, long after the armed conflict had come to an end.<sup>19</sup>

### ***Social Network Analysis and ‘Mobilization of Fear’***

One of the methods the Sri Lankan government used to mobilize fear was a counter-insurgency strategy referred to as ‘Social Network Analysis’ [‘SNA’].<sup>20</sup> SNA is a counter-insurgency strategy involving mapping out social dynamics and relational links within a community, and then using this analysis to identify important nodes and hubs within the community that could be seen as targets.<sup>21</sup> Destruction of these nodes/hubs would mean destruction of the social network within the community, which analysts determined was key to an insurgency.<sup>22</sup> MacGinty *et. al.* wrote that SNA was a key part of the Sri Lankan military’s counter-insurgency strategy during and after the last phase of the armed conflict:

While the LTTE itself was a hierarchical organization, SNA – with its focus on horizontal societal linkages – was adept at identifying connections between individuals according to family, caste, student association, profession and the like. Thus, it was well suited to identifying those suspected of being ancillary to the main LTTE. It should be noted that the boundaries between LTTE members and supporters were blurred. Information from SNA led to the targeting of specific individuals. The campaign of ‘disappearances’ occurred both in government-held and LTTE-held territory, with state Deep Penetration Units operating in the latter.<sup>23</sup>

As MacGinty notes, Human Rights Watch estimated that 1500 people were disappeared between December 2005 and December 2007, even before the war’s final horrific end.<sup>24</sup>

The use of SNA as a military strategy continued following the conclusion of the war as well:

...those who fled into government-held territory were recorded, screened and issued with new identity papers with barcodes. The Sri Lankan government set about constructing a database that mapped the Tamil population and used social network software to make linkages between the general Tamil population and Tamil militancy and activism. The displacement and screening of the Tamil population had already been carried out in much of the east of the country in 2007 and early 2008 following the defection of Colonel Karuna. The new military offensive against the main LTTE led to displacement – and therefore the recording

and screening of the Tamil population – on a large-scale. Tamil civilians displaced by fighting in the north and east were ordered to register with the police.<sup>25</sup>

One of the primary ways in which the military identified people during and after the war and established these social networks was through the use of informants.<sup>26</sup> Following Karuna’s defection from the LTTE, the cadres from Karuna’s unit became an integral part of the intelligence of the Sri Lankan security forces and helped them to identify targets. The International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) notes in their latest report on the Sri Lankan Special Task Force (STF):

Intelligence for abductions in Colombo also came from the Karuna group. Indeed security force witnesses say the intelligence from the Tamil group was “extensive and of much better quality” than STF intelligence, leading to a higher success rate in apprehending suspects and an increase in abduction missions to three or four times a week.<sup>27</sup>

In addition, post-2009, a number of former LTTE cadres captured during this last phase were forced to point out other cadres in the displacement camps, and long after the war had ended in their own villages.<sup>28</sup> As one cadre reported, “the military made me stand at a corner and nod if I saw someone who was linked to the LTTE, and threatened to hurt my family if I didn’t.”<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, in addition to being afraid of possible consequences of being perceived to be anti-state by the security forces, Tamil people also became afraid of their fellow villagers. “I don’t know who told them – I think it was my brother-in-law,” one villager told a university student after CID had visited his home following that student’s visit.<sup>30</sup> “If there’s a car in front of my house, the CID finds out shortly after and the only people who could have told them are fellow villagers so how I can trust them?” a war widow and former LTTE cadre told the author during research in 2017.<sup>31</sup> A disappearances activist from the East recounting his experience of harassment and intimidation in 2018 said, “[t]he person linked to military intelligence who was calling me and harassing me is the brother of a mother of disappeared I work with – this is the state of our community.”<sup>32</sup>

### ***Militarization and the Mobilization of Fear***

Levels of suspicion and distrust are further elevated in communities where the military has pursued

aggressive campaigns to employ former LTTE cadres and war-affected women; people who are subsequently perceived by their communities as too closely linked to the military.<sup>33</sup>

In 2012-2013, the Ministry of Defence-run “Civil Security Department” (‘CSD’) began recruiting and hiring Tamil civilians in the Vanni region, with a particular focus on hiring former LTTE cadres and war-affected women.<sup>34</sup> According to the CSD’s own estimates, it now employs between 3200-3500 individuals in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts, largely comprised of former LTTE cadres, and two-thirds of whom are women.<sup>35</sup> The CSD has its origins in the National Home Guard Service which was an auxiliary voluntary service for the Sri Lanka security forces originally created in 1986.<sup>36</sup> The Home Guard service itself stands accused of participation in perpetrating a number of atrocity crimes against the Tamil population.<sup>37</sup> In 2006, the National Home Guard Service was converted into the CSD through a gazette ordered by then Secretary of Defence, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.<sup>38</sup> Up until 2009, the CSD/Home Guard largely existed in border villages and served a critical counter-insurgency function - both providing an informal intelligence network for the military, and working to prevent the re-emergence of the LTTE in areas that were captured by the military.<sup>39</sup> It is important to contextualize the CSD thus to better understand the consequences of the CSD’s recruitment of former LTTE cadres and/or Tamil women.

While many former LTTE cadres did not originally want to join the CSD out of fear/loathing of working for the military, many eventually did, either due to economic necessity or as a way to reduce surveillance/harassment.<sup>40</sup> But CSD employees were then stigmatized by their communities, and viewed with suspicion and distrust as they are seen as an arm of the military. This is furthered by the military’s mandatory requirement that all CSD employees (including as of April 2018, pre-school teachers) attend compulsory military training ending with the provision of a military uniform for them to wear to events and in certain public spaces.<sup>41</sup> CSD employees themselves also self-select out of participating in civic and political engagement within their communities.<sup>42</sup> Even more than the general population, CSD employees are subject to constant surveillance by the military, and many CSD employees interviewed reported that within their

ranks there were those who gathered intelligence for the security forces.<sup>43</sup> Further to this, CSD employees were told as part of their training that they could not engage in any activity seen as against the government, which many employees interpret as any kind of civic or political engagement.<sup>44</sup> “People work for the security forces out of necessity but the army uses it as an opportunity to isolate that individual from the community,” one CSD employee told the author.<sup>45</sup> Of all subsets of the Tamil population that the author interviewed during a two-year period in the North-East, employees of the CSD were the most fearful of possible repercussions for participating in any kind of civic or political engagement. Tamil women within this category are even further marginalized due to stigmatization of them as being linked to the military through sexual relations.<sup>46</sup> While the fact of sexual relations is apparent, there are serious concerns about lack of consent in these sexual encounters between soldiers and CSD employees, and the possibility they may amount to sexual harassment, assault and/or rape due to the power imbalances and militarized circumstances under which they occur.<sup>47</sup>

The militarization and securitization project beginning with the war and continuing post-2009 therefore has had a clear negative impact on intra-community trust and cohesiveness within Tamil communities across the North-East through its “mobilization of fear” and its fostering of suspicion and mistrust. This is particularly true in the Vanni, which was the LTTE stronghold and has the highest physical concentration of military personnel along with a very deep level of military involvement in civilian activities. There, more than in any other area, the omnipresent eyes of the security state are felt.

### **Militarization and a Reduction of Social Capital**

It is useful to consider the breakdown in intra-community trust and cohesiveness within the sociological idea of social capital; a useful construct in framing the potential implications of the militarization project in post-war Sri Lanka. The seminal definition of ‘social capital’ “refers to features of social organizations such as trust, norms [of reciprocity], and networks [of civic engagement] that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordination actions.”<sup>48</sup> There can be different forms of social capital, including between different communities, but in this context we are particularly concerned with ‘bonding social capital’ which refers to the “social capital that builds intra-

group solidarity.”<sup>49</sup> Within this framework, militarization and securitization can be understood as having resulted in the reduction of bonding social capital, evidenced by the reduction of intra-community trust and cohesiveness as well as by the elimination of vital nodes of social networks through abductions and killings. Vital nodes can be understood as anyone in the community who possesses the potential to build intra-community networks and coordinate society, i.e. student leaders, human rights activists, community and political leaders, leaders in the militant movement, etc.<sup>50</sup>

As outlined above, in the Sri Lankan context, the military’s reduction of social capital did not end with the end of the war and was not limited just to the LTTE, but rather was applied to the entire Tamil community, particularly those emerging from the last phase of the war from the Vanni.

So what does this reduction in bonding social capital mean in terms of the Tamil community’s political and civic engagement, particularly that which challenges the Sinhala state order and is premised on self-determination and nationhood? It has been established that “[t]he various forms of social capital contribute to successful collective action, almost always, by enhancing trust among the actors.”<sup>51</sup> Collective action includes mass political mobilization, such as was the case with the *satyagrahas* led by Tamil political leaders in the 60s and 70s.<sup>52</sup> Problems with respect to collective action “arise whenever individuals face alternative courses of action between short-term self-regarding choices and one that, if followed by a large enough number of individuals in a group, benefits all.”<sup>53</sup>

Applying this to the current context in the North-East, many Tamil individuals are having to choose between working for the military/accepting other pacification measures by the Sri Lankan state, and continuing to support and espouse a Tamil national identity challenging the Sri Lankan state and organize and mobilize for the latter accordingly.<sup>54</sup> However, as R. K. Guruparan argues, “the impression is being forcefully created that seeking self-determination is inimical to the very survival of the Tamil community.”<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, the choice of foregoing the Tamil national identity in favour of support for the Sri Lankan state, is perceived as providing short-term benefits to individuals as it ensures they are not seen as anti-state and do not thus have to worry about the associated consequences

flowing from the militarization and securitization project discussed above. Further, those who do support the state in the form of accepting employment from the military or other state organs also perceive this as a short-term benefit, as it alleviates severe unemployment and debt issues: “The struggle is converted on realist terms to one of daily survival and not of self-determination.”<sup>56</sup>

The question thus becomes: does a reduction in bonding social capital within Tamil communities reduce their willingness to adopt civic and political engagement in support of the collective (Tamil national identity and politics)? Theoretically, it should, but this hypothesis has yet to be subjected to rigorous qualitative and quantitative research on the ground. Some experiential conclusions can be drawn though. Using the CSD as a case study, the CSD’s Tamil employees, who are already stigmatized and isolated from their communities, are becoming more willing with time to withdraw from any civic or political engagement with the Tamil national identity that could be seen as anti-state, thereby fitting the paradigm.<sup>57</sup> While this withdrawal is not solely the result of a reduction in bonding social capital, as other factors including the military’s increased surveillance over them play a role, research has demonstrated it certainly plays a factor.<sup>58</sup> “Our Tamil politicians and the diaspora don’t help us and the community is afraid to come to talk to us so what else are we supposed to do? We have no choice but to take their [the military’s] jobs. Why should we bother voting when our community rejects us?” one former LTTE cadre employed by the CSD told the author in 2018.<sup>59</sup> Another CSD employee told the author in 2017 that there used to be sense of community ownership over issues that arose pre-2009, but “today that sense of collective is not present.”<sup>60</sup> One CSD employee who when originally interviewed in 2017 was able to critically view the military’s role in employing her, later in 2018, had shifted to fully supporting the military’s role in the North-East and condemning Tamil national parties.<sup>61</sup>

What is also evident is that the reasons often cited by Tamils in the North-East to explain why they do not participate in political and civic processes fall under the three broad factors already outlined in this paper: (1) a Tamil political framework premised on nationhood challenges the Sinhala state order; (2) the reduction in intra-community trust and cohesiveness (bonding social capital); and (3) the ‘mobilization of

fear'. Many are afraid of the consequences of being perceived as anti-state (in the present and/or future); those who are stigmatized already by the community due to militarization/ securitization feel excluded from networks and self-select out of engagement; and finally, those who do want to engage do not trust their fellow neighbours not to report them to military/police intelligence if they do participate.

This means that in the future, Tamil nationalist political parties may have a harder time politically mobilizing their constituents and it may become easier for more Sinhala state order-aligned parties to make inroads. Some would argue looking at the results of the January 2018 local government elections, this could already be happening. Tamil nationalist parties (identified as the TNA, TNPF and TULF) won 17% less of the vote share across the North-East in the 2018 local government elections than they did in the 2015 General Elections.<sup>62</sup> While this is by no means a perfect comparison due to the difference in number of members elected and levels of government facing election, the loss still is a sign of a possible wane in support for Tamil national identity, if it is to be understood electorally; particularly as the loss was accompanied across the North-East by a rise in support for Sri Lankan national parties and state-aligned Tamil parties such as the EPDP.<sup>63</sup>

### **Social Capital, Militarization and the Normalization Problem**

M. Rasaratnam writes that the consolidation of Tamil opposition post-independence was “the outcome of step-wise and temporally continuous processes of organization and mobilization that established the idea of a Tamil national identity as a dominant and unavoidable presence in Tamil political life.”<sup>64</sup> Understanding Tamil national identity-based politics as the outcome of a political process as opposed to primordial ethnic nationalism (a trope by many scholars), one can understand how Tamil nationalism can also be changed and affected by political processes. The reduction of bonding social capital which negatively impacts the Tamil community’s capacity to self-organize and mobilize for civic and political engagement seen under the broad anti-state lens described above, is one such political process that has the power to impact Tamil political aspirations centred on nationhood.

Again taking the CSD and oppressive military structures as a case study, many CSD employees no longer problematize the military’s role in employing them. As some employees who are former LTTE cadres reportedly told *Ceylon Today* recently, “[w]e are working with trust, respect and love with military officers and members of other communities under a zero weapon concept.”<sup>65</sup> While some recognize that the CSD may be attempting to silence their voices, they have become resigned to this fate, and there is limited dissent from within victim-survivor populations in the Vanni to end the military’s role in civilian activities.<sup>66</sup> One former LTTE cadre told the author, “we had a war and we lost so this [being subservient to the military] is our fate.”<sup>67</sup> As the military increasingly engages in so-called ‘reconciliation’ activities such as civilian-military sports tournaments and prize-giving, and further increases their role in other civilian activities such as agriculture and education, their presence in the community is becoming normalized, and the community’s recognition of their presence as oppressive is also shifting.<sup>68</sup> Recently in interviews with displaced persons in Keppapilavu, many of them told the author, “[w]e just want our lands back, we don’t care if the military keeps their camps.”<sup>69</sup> However, by the same token, they spoke about fear of the military and fear of sending their children to walk by the camps.<sup>70</sup> Oppression by the state through militarization and securitization post-2009 in many ways has become the status quo in the North-East.

However, also as a result of Tamil national identity being the consequence of a political process, one cannot definitively conclude that the reduction of bonding social capital would result in a change to Tamil political aspirations being centred on the Tamil national identity. One of the reasons it is hard to make that conclusion on the basis of social capital theory alone is because political processes are complex and multi-faceted and one important political process that has always driven Tamil national identity is the oppression of Tamils by the Sri Lankan state,<sup>71</sup> which continues. Despite being the most heavily militarized region in the country and a region with a high number of military-employed Tamils, Tamil communities in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu still overwhelmingly turned out for Maaveerar Naal (Tamil Heroes Day) in 2016 and 2017.<sup>72</sup> However, these areas also saw the largest decline in vote share for Tamil nationalist

parties in the 2018 local government elections, at 24% and 22% declines, respectively.<sup>73</sup> Thus, it is clear that the political processes behind Tamil nationalism are complex and cannot be easily explained by one factor alone.

### Conclusion

Processes of militarization and securitization are creating in parallel: mobilization of fear; reduction of social bonding capital; and normalization/internalization of oppression. If these phenomena continue there is a growing risk that Tamil political aspirations centred on self-determination and nationhood from the grassroots population will be dampened as Tamil collective action and political/civic engagement declines. However, at the same time, these phenomena should not be viewed fatalistically. As demonstrated by the renewed resistance and emergence of protest culture in the North-East in the small space that has opened up since 2015<sup>74</sup>, as well as the overwhelming turnout for Tamil national commemorative events such as Maaveerar Naal in 2016 and 2017,<sup>75</sup> Tamil identity and nationhood still remains an indomitable force. Further to this, another important stakeholder in Tamil political aspirations that this paper does not explore, but should not be ignored, is the immense Tamil diaspora. As M. Rasaratnam writes, despite being organizationally fragmented, the main diaspora organizations are “bound by unity on the core principles of Tamil nationalism; that is Tamils’ national status and the demand for self-rule in their homeland.”<sup>76</sup> This has continued post-2009, and also has an important role in driving the direction of Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka. Yet as this paper explores, the long-term impacts of militarization and securitization on Tamil collective identity and politics must be further examined and addressed if Tamil communities are to continue to be free to frame their own identity and aspirations.

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- <sup>24</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup>“Normalizing the Abnormal: The Militarisation of Mullaitivu”, ACPR and PEARL, supra at pp 25-27; “Sri Lanka: Treatment of suspected members or supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), including information about how many are in detention; whether the government continues to screen Tamils in an attempt to identify LTTE suspects (2011-January 2015)” (January 2015), Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa.
- <sup>27</sup>“Sri Lanka’s Special Task Force” (April 2018), International Truth and Justice Project, at p 14.
- <sup>28</sup>Interviews with Tamil communities by author, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, June – July 2017; Informal conversations with former LTTE cadres by author, North-East Sri Lanka, January 2017 – April 2018; “Normalizing the Abnormal: The Militarisation of Mullaitivu”, ACPR and PEARL, supra at pp 25-27; “Sri Lanka: Treatment of suspected members or supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), including information about how many are in detention; whether the government continues to screen Tamils in an attempt to identify LTTE suspects (2011-January 2015)” (January 2015), Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa.
- <sup>29</sup>Interview with former LTTE cadre by ACPR, August 2017.
- <sup>30</sup>Interview by ACPR with university student, Batticaloa, July 2017.
- <sup>31</sup>Interview with former LTTE cadre by author, Kilinochchi, April 2017.
- <sup>32</sup>Interview with Disappearances activist by author, Trincomalee, April 2018.
- <sup>33</sup>“Civil Security Department: The Deep Militarization of the Vanni”, ACPR, supra at p 19-20.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid at pp 6-9.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid at pp 5 and 20.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid at p 3.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid at p 4.
- <sup>38</sup>Ibid at p 3.
- <sup>39</sup>Ibid at pp 4-5.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid at p 6.

- <sup>41</sup>Ibid at pp 11-12, 19-20; “Pre-school teachers ordered to attend training at military camp” (April 2018), Tamil Guardian.
- <sup>42</sup>“Civil Security Department: The Deep Militarization of the Vanni”, ACPR, supra at p 18-19.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid at p 19.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup>Ibid at pp 20-22.
- <sup>47</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>48</sup>Goodhand et al., “Social Capital and the Political Economy of Violence: A Case Study of Sri Lanka” (2000), *Disasters*, 24(4), at p 391 citing Putnam et al [“Goodhand et al., ”Social Capital and the Political Economy of Violence: A Case Study of Sri Lanka”].
- <sup>49</sup>Ibid at p 392.
- <sup>50</sup>Roger MacGinty, “Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: A counterproductive strategy?”supra, at p 218.
- <sup>51</sup>Elinor Ostrom and T.K.Ahn, “The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action” (2007) published in *Handbook on Social Capital*, ed. Svendsen et al (2008), at p 8.
- <sup>52</sup>Madurika Rasaratnam, “Tamils and the Nation: India and Sri Lanka Compared”, supra at pp 148-157.
- <sup>53</sup>Elinor Ostrom and T.K.Ahn, “The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action” (2007) published in *Handbook on Social Capital*, ed. Svendsen et al (2008), at p 5.
- <sup>54</sup>This paper accepts that normatively a Tamil political framework premised on self-determination is the most effective form for realization of rights for the collective Tamil community in Sri Lanka.
- <sup>55</sup>R.K. Guruparan, “Text of the Mamanithar Late Prof C.J. Eliezer AM Memorial Lecture delivered on 12 June 2016 at the Monash University, Clayton Campus, Melbourne” (June 2016).
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup>“Civil Security Department: The Deep Militarization of the Vanni”, ACPR, supra at p 18-19.
- <sup>58</sup>Interviews with CSD farm employees and CSD-paid pre-school teachers, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, June-July 2017, and April 2018.
- <sup>59</sup>Interview with CSD farm employee by author, Mullaitivu, April 2018.
- <sup>60</sup>Interview with CSD-paid pre-school teacher by author, Kilinochchi, July 2017.
- <sup>61</sup>Interview with CSD farm employees by author, Mullaitivu, April 2018.
- <sup>62</sup>Elijah Hoole, “Splintering Tamil Vote: A Post-Mortem Report” (March 2018), *Sunday Observer*.
- <sup>63</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup>Madurika Rasaratnam, “Tamils and the Nation: India and Sri Lanka Compared”, supra at p 148.
- <sup>65</sup>Gagani Weerakoon, “The struggle goes on” (April 2017), *Ceylon Today*.
- <sup>66</sup>“Civil Security Department: The Deep Militarization of the Vanni”, ACPR, supra at p 20.
- <sup>67</sup>Interview with CSD farm employee by author, Mullaitivu, June 2017.
- <sup>68</sup>“Normalizing the Abnormal: The Militarisation of Mullaitivu”, ACPR and PEARL, supra, at pp 19-30.
- <sup>69</sup>Interview with Keppapilavu villagers protesting by author, Mullaitivu, March 2018.
- <sup>70</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup>Ibid at p 147.
- <sup>72</sup>“Resistance and Resilience” (November 2017), *Tamil Guardian*.
- <sup>73</sup>Elijah Hoole, “Splintering Tamil Vote: A Post-Mortem Report” (March 2018), *Sunday Observer*.
- <sup>74</sup>“Joint Civil Society Statement in Solidarity with Families of Disappeared’ Year-Long Protest” (February 2018), *Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research*; Dharsha Jegatheeswaran and Mario Arulthas, “We will not move from here until we get our land back: from inside the Pilavu protest” (February 2017), *Tamil Guardian*.
- <sup>75</sup>“Resistance and Resilience” (November 2017), *Tamil Guardian*.
- <sup>76</sup>Madurika Rasaratnam, “Tamils and the Nation: India and Sri Lanka Compared”, supra at p 224.